German involvement in the Spanish Civil War commenced with the outbreak of war in July 1936, with Adolf Hitler immediately sending in air and armored units to assist General Francisco Franco and his Nationalist forces. In opposition, the Soviet Union sent in smaller forces equipped with more advanced equipment to assist the Republican government, while Britain and France and two dozen other countries set up an embargo on any munitions or soldiers into Spain. Nazi Germany also signed the embargo, but simply ignored it.
The war provided combat experience with the latest technology for the German military. However, the intervention also posed the risk of escalating into a general European war, for which Hitler was not ready. He therefore limited his aid, and instead encouraged Mussolini to send in large Italian units. Nonetheless, German involvement proved crucial to Franco's Nationalists winning the conflict. Despite this, he remained officially neutral in the Second World War, but helped the Axis in various ways from 1940 to 1943, even offering to join the war on 19 June 1940 in exchange for help building Spain's colonial empire and held unsuccessful negotiations on the border town of Hendaye in October for this purpose.Weinberg, Gerhard. A World in Arms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 page 177. The Spanish conflict lasted three years and was a smaller-scale prelude to the world war which broke out in 1939.
Nazi support for General Franco was motivated by several factors, including as a distraction from Hitler's central European strategy, and the creation of a Spanish state friendly to Germany to threaten France. It further provided an opportunity to train men and test equipment and tactics.
Military operations Hitler decided to support the Nationalists in July 1936. The Luftwaffe was used to carry the Army of Africa to Spain. A Spanish-German Spanish–Moroccan Transport Company (HISMA) and an entirely German company, the "Raw Materials and Goods Purchasing Company" (ROWAK) were established. German transports moved nearly 2,500 troops from Spanish Morocco to Spain.
Early intervention helped to ensure the Nationalists successes in the war's initial stages. The training they provided to the Nationalists proved as valuable, if not more so, than direct actions. From 29 July to 11 October the Germans transported 13,523 Moroccan troops and 270,100 kilograms of war material from Morocco to Andalusia; and it was Franco's African forces, thus transported and supplied, which were a decisive factor in the war. Germany signed the Non-Intervention Agreement on 24 August 1936, but consistently broke it.
After a Republican air attack on the German warship , Germany and Italy said they would withdraw from the Non-Intervention Committee and from maritime patrols. Early June 1937 saw the return of Germany and Italy to the committee and patrols, but they withdrew from patrols following a further attack. The German military in Spain, who were later reorganised and renamed the Condor Legion, claimed to have destroyed a total of 372 Republican planes and 60 Spanish Republican Navy ships. They lost 72 aircraft due to hostile action and another 160 to accidents. German aid to the Nationalists amounted to approximately £43,000,000 ($215,000,000) in 1939 prices.
German air crews supported the Nationalist advance on Madrid and the relief of the Siege of the Alcázar. The Condor Legion's aircraft were accompanied by two armoured units. By the end of 1936, 7,000 Germans were in Spain. The Nationalists were supported by German units and equipment during the Battle of Madrid and during the Battle of Jarama of February 1937. The fighting demonstrated the inadequacy of the Legion's aircraft compared to superior Soviet-made fighters. The War in the North was supported by a constantly re-equipping Condor Legion.
In Operation Rügen, waves of planes bombed and strafed targets in Guernica leaving 1,685 people dead and over 900 injured. The offensive on Bilbao was supported by ground units and extensive air operations. It proved the worth of the Legion to the Nationalist cause. The Legion also took part in the Battle of Brunete and both land and air forces were involved in the Battle of Teruel. Up to 100 sorties a day were launched during the Nationalists' counter-offensive. The continued Nationalist offensive on Aragon in April–June 1937, including the Battle of Belchite, involved bombing raids and the use of the Legion's ground forces.
On 24–25 July, Republican forces launched the Battle of the Ebro. Reconnaissance units of the Condor Legion warned Nationalists forces, but this went unheeded. 422 sorties by the Legion's aircraft had considerable effect. A reinforcement of the Legion enabled an important Nationalist counter-attack. At sea, the Maritime Reconnaissance Staffel of the Condor Legion acted against Republican shipping, ports, coastal communications and occasionally inland targets. The German North Sea Group around Spain, part of the Kriegsmarine, consisted of the pocket battleships Deutschland and , the light cruiser , and four torpedo boats. In addition, Operation Ursula saw a group of German U-boats active around Spain, but was ultimately a failure.
Motivation and volunteers In the years following the Spanish Civil War, Hitler gave several possible motives for German involvement. Among these were the distraction it provided from German re-militarisation; the prevention of the spread of communism to Western Europe; the creation of a state friendly to Germany to disrupt Britain and France; and the possibilities for economic expansion. Although the offensive on Madrid was abandoned in March 1937, a series of attacks on weaker Republican-controlled areas was supported by Germany; despite prolonging the Civil War, it would help to distract the other western powers from Hitler's ambitions in central Europe.Westwell (2004). p. 29. The offensive on Vizcaya, a mining and industrial centre, would help fuel German industry.Westwell (2004). p. 30. On 27 June 1937, Hitler (in a speech at Würzburg) declared he supported Franco to gain control of Spanish ore.Thomas (1961). p. 459.
Discussions over German objectives for intervention occurred in January 1937. Germany was keen to avoid prompting a Europe-wide war, which at the time they felt committing further resources to Spain would do.Thomas (1961). p. 341. Contradictory views were held by German officials: Ernst von Weizsäcker suggested it was merely a matter of graceful withdrawal; Hermann Göring stated that Germany would never recognise a "red Spain". A joint Italian–German decision, that the last shipments would be made by the start of February, was agreed. German aid would therefore prevent a Nationalist defeat with a minimum of commitment.Thomas (1961). p. 342.
Involvement in the Spanish Civil War had drawn Mussolini closer to Hitler, helping to get Mussolini's agreement for Hitler's plans for union (Anschluss) with Austria.Cienciala (1968). p. 30. The authoritarian Catholic, anti-Nazi Vaterländische Front government of autonomous Austria had been successfully opposing the rise of Fascism,Payne (1996). p. 250. and following the assassination of Austria's authoritarian chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss in 1934, had already successfully invoked Italian military assistance in case of a German invasion. Hitler's need to prevent an Italian invasion was settled with the Rome–Berlin Axis, partway into the Spanish Civil War.Payne (1996). p. 251.
Around 5,000 Germans and Austrians served with the International Brigades, some of whom were political refugees.Knight (1998). pp. 71–72.
Non-Intervention Agreement
Non-intervention, and with it the Non-Intervention Agreement, had been proposed in a joint diplomatic initiative by the governments of France and the United Kingdom,Beevor (2006). p. 374. in order to prevent the war from escalating into a major pan-European conflict.Stone (1997). p. 134. On 4 August 1936, non-intervention was put to Nazi Germany by the French. The German position was that such a declaration was not needed, but discussions could be held on preventing the spread of the war to the rest of Europe, so long as the USSR was present.Thomas (1961). p. 257. It was mentioned at that meeting that Germany was already supplying the Nationalists.
On 9 August, the Germans informed the British that 'no war materials had been sent from Germany and none will', which was blatantly false.Thomas (1961). p. 259. One German Ju 52 aircraft was captured when it came down in Republican territory. Its release would be required before Germany signed the Non-Intervention Pact.Alpert (1998). p. 44. There was a growing belief that countries would not abide by the agreement anyway.Thomas (1961). p. 260. Admiral Erich Raeder urged the German government to either back the Nationalists more completely, and bring Europe to the brink of war, or abandon them. On the 24th, Germany signed.Thomas (1961). p. 261. It was at this point that the Non-Intervention Committee was created to uphold the agreement, but the double-dealing of the USSR and Germany had already become apparent.Thomas (1961). pp. 263–264. Germany consistently broke the agreement they had signed.Stone (1997). p. 133.
The Non-Intervention Committee was established to enforce the Non-Intervention Agreement. Germany was represented by Joachim von Ribbentrop (with Otto Christian Archibald von Bismarck as deputy) but left the running to the Italian Dino Grandi,Alpert (1998). p. 61. although they found working with him difficult.Thomas (1961). p. 278. It became clear the Non-Intervention Agreement was not preventing German aid to the Nationalists.Preston (2006). p. 150. On 18 November, the German government recognised the Nationalists as the true government of Spain.Thomas (1961). p. 332. Germany met the request to ban volunteers on 7 January. Hitler himself authored the German declaration.Thomas (1961). p. 340. German uneasiness about the scale, limitations and outcomes of intervention in Spain remained. German diplomats spoke as if their men in Spain were genuine volunteers. However, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia continued to believe a European war was not in their best interests.Thomas (1961). pp. 342–343.
Control plan Observers were posted to Spanish ports and borders, and both Ribbentrop and Grandi were told by their governments to agree to the plan, significant shipments already having taken place.Thomas (1961). p. 394. The cost of the scheme was put at £898,000, of which Germany would pay 16 percent. The German delegation appears to have hoped the control plan was effective.Thomas (1961). pp. 395–396.
In May, the Committee noted an attack on the German pocket battleship .Bulletin of International News (1937). p. 3. Germany and Italy said they would withdraw from the Committee, and from the patrols, unless it could be guaranteed there would be no further attacks.Thomas (1961). p. 441. Early June saw the return of Germany and Italy to the committee and patrols.Thomas (1961). p. 456. It continued to be a crime in Germany to mention German operations. Following attacks (attributed to Republicans by Germany, but denied) on the German cruiser on 15 and 18 June, Germany and Italy once again withdrew from patrols, but not from the Committee.Thomas (1961). p. 457.Bulletin of International News (1937). pp. 4–5. Discussions about patrols remained complicated. Britain and France offered to replace Germany and Italy in patrols of their sections, but the latter powers believed these patrols would be too partial.Bulletin of International News (1937). p. 7.
Early intervention