The Contras (from ) were the anti-communist rebels who waged a guerrilla war against the Marxist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the Junta of National Reconstruction, which came to power after the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979. The insurgency against the Sandinista government lasted from 1979 until 1990, and was one of the highest profile conflicts of the Cold War.
In July 1979, the FSLN took control of the capital Managua after weeks of heavy fighting. The president at the time, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, fled the country and relinquished control of the central government, leaving the Sandinistas in power. The Sandinistas created a junta that acted as an interim government immediately after. Various groups were created in response to this, consisting of dissidents of the new government and members of the former National Guard. These groups would regularly meet and establish the Contras in 1980.
During the insurgency, the United States and several other countries provided military assistance and financial aid to the Contras. In 1981, the CIA and Argentina's Secretariat of Intelligence persuaded several Contra groups to unite into the larger Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN).
In 1982, the Boland Amendment was passed to end U.S. aid to the Contras; yet the Reagan administration continued to illegally fund the Contras, which resulted in a scandal known as the Iran–Contra affair. By 1987, most of the Contra militias had united into the Nicaraguan Resistance, within which the Nicaraguan Democratic Force was the largest group.
During the war, the Contras' tactics featured terrorism and human rights violations against civilians. The Reagan administration contended that the Contras' tactics did not include deliberate attacks against civilians. The CIA said that Contra terrorism resulted from "the poor discipline characteristic of irregular forces", that terrorism was not an official military doctrine of the Contras, and that the Contra leader responsible, Comandante Suicida, was executed. The Global Terrorism Database reports that Contras carried out more than 1,300 terrorist attacks.
After a cutoff in U.S. military support, and with both sides facing international pressure to bring an end to the conflict, the contras agreed to negotiations with the FSLN. With the help of five Central American presidents, including Daniel Ortega (then-President of Nicaragua), the sides agreed that a voluntary demobilization of the Contras should start in early December 1989. They chose this date to facilitate free and fair elections in Nicaragua in February 1990.
History
Origins The Contras were not a monolithic group, but a combination of three distinct elements of Nicaraguan society:
Ex-guardsmen of the Nicaraguan National Guard and other right-wing figures who fought in Anastasio Somoza García's government before Somoza's government collapsed in 1979.Lee et al. 1987, p. 29 The guardsmen later comprised a significant portion of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the largest Contra organization."The contras are made up of a combination of: ex-National Guardsmen (especially the military wing of the FDN)" As seen at: Gill 1984, p. 204 Remnants of the Guard later formed groups such as the Fifteenth of September Legion, the Anti-Sandinista Guerrilla Special Forces, and the National Army of Liberation. Initially however, these groups were small and conducted little active raiding into Nicaragua.Dickey, Christopher. With the Contras, A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua. Simon & Schuster, 1985. Anti-Somoza activists who supported the revolution but felt betrayed by the Sandinista government, such as Édgar Chamorro, a member of the FDN's political directorate,"The contras are made up of a combination of: ... anti-Sandinista opponents of ex-dictator Somoza (some of the members of the FDN political directorate eg Messrs. Chamorro and Cruz)" As seen at: Gill 1984, p. 204 and José Francisco Cardenal, who briefly served in the Council of State before leaving Nicaragua following a disagreement with the Sandinista government's policies and founding the Nicaraguan Democratic Union (UDN), an opposition group of Nicaraguan exiles based in Miami.International Court of Justice (IV) (1986), p. 446 Another example was MILPAS (Milicias Populares Anti-Sandinistas), a peasant militia led by disillusioned Sandinista veterans from the northern mountains. Founded by Pedro Joaquín González, known as "Dimas", the Milpistas were also known as (green corn). Following Dimas' death, MILPAS bands emerged in 1980 and 1981. The Milpistas were composed largely of (peasant) highlanders and rural workers.Padro-Maurer, R. The Contras 1980–1989, a Special Kind of Politics. NY: Praeger Publishers, 1990.Brown, Timothy C. The Real Contra War, Highlander Peasant Resistance in Nicaragua. University of Oklahoma Press, 2001. Nicaraguans who had avoided direct involvement in the revolution but opposed the Sandinistas.
Main groups
In September 1981, the CIA and Argentina's intelligence agency, seeking to unify the anti-Sandinista cause before initiating large scale aid, persuaded 15 September Legion, the UDN, and several former smaller groups to merge as the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, which was known in Spanish as Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense and was often referred to as FDN, a Spanish acronym.
The FDN was led by Enrique Bermudez, its military commander, who led its war efforts against the Sandinistas, and Adolfo Calero Portocarrero, a Nicaraguan businessman who opposed the Somoza regime and led its political directorate."Although Calero opposed Somoza, the FDN had its roots in two insurgent groups made up of former National Guardsmen" As seen at: Lee et al. 1987, p. 29 Édgar Chamorro later said that the UDN opposed working with the Guardsmen and that the merging only took place because of insistence by the CIA."The UDN, including Cardenal, initially opposed any linkage with the Guardsmen. The CIA, and high-ranking United States government officials, insisted that we merge with the Guardsmen. Lt. General Vernon Walters, then a special assistant to the United States Secretary of State (and formerly Deputy Director of the CIA) met with Cardenal to encourage him to accept the CIA's proposal. We were well aware of the crimes the Guardsmen had committed against the Nicaraguan people while in the service of President Somoza and we wanted nothing to do with them. However, we recognized that without help from the United States Government we had no chance of removing the Sandinistas from power, so we eventually acceded to the CIA's, and General Walters', insistence that we join forces with the Guardsmen. Some UDN members resigned because they would not associate themselves with the National Guard under any circumstances, but Cardenal and I and others believed the CIA's assurances that we, the civilians, would control the Guardsmen in the new organization that was to be created." As seen at: International Court of Justice (IV) 1986, p. 446
Based in Honduras, Nicaragua's northern neighbor, under the command of former National Guard Colonel Enrique Bermúdez, the new FDN began recruiting other smaller insurgent forces in the north. Largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized by the U.S.,"On the basis of the available information, the Court is not able to satisfy itself that the Respondent State 'created' the Contra force in Nicaragua, but holds it established that it largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the FDN, one element of the force." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, VII (4) it emerged as the largest and most active Contra group."The largest and most active of these groups, which later came to be known as ... (FDN)". As seen at: Lee et al. 1987, p. 29
In April 1982, Edén Pastora (Comandante Cero), one of the heroes in the fight against Somoza, organized the Sandinista Revolutionary Front (FRS) – embedded in the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) – and declared war on the Sandinista government.Lee et al. 1987, p. 32 Himself a former Sandinista who had held several high posts in the government, he had resigned abruptly in 1981 and defected, believing that the newly found power had corrupted the Sandinistas' original ideas. A popular and charismatic leader, Pastora initially saw his group develop quickly. He confined himself to operate in the southern part of Nicaragua;"He insisted on operating in the southern part of Nicaragua." As seen at: Lee et al. 1987, p. 32 after a press conference he was holding on 30 May 1984 was bombed, he "voluntarily withdrew" from the Contra struggle.
A third force, Misurasata, appeared among the Miskito, Mayangna and Rama Amerindian peoples of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, who in December 1981 found themselves in conflict with the authorities following the government's efforts to nationalize Indian land. In the course of this conflict, forced removal of at least 10,000 Indians to relocation centers in the interior of the country and subsequent burning of some villages took place.The Americas Watch Committee. "Human Rights in Nicaragua 1986" (print), Americas Watch, February 1987. The Misurasata movement split in 1983, with the breakaway Misura group of Stedman Fagoth Muller, which aligned more closely with the FDN, and the rest accommodating themselves with the Sandinistas: on 8 December 1984 a ceasefire agreement known as the Bogota Accord was signed by Misurasata and the Nicaraguan government. A subsequent autonomy statute in September 1987 largely defused Miskito resistance.From Conflict to Autonomy in Nicaragua: Lessons Learned
Unity efforts
U.S. officials were active in attempting to unite the Contra groups. In June 1985 most of the groups reorganized as the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), under the leadership of Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz, and Alfonso Robelo, each of whom opposed the Sandinista revolution. After UNO's dissolution early in 1987, the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) was organized along similar lines in May.
U.S. military and financial assistance
In front of the International Court of Justice, the Nicaraguan government claimed that the Contras were altogether a creation of the U.S.Gill 1989, p. 328 This claim was rejected but the evidence of a very close relationship between the Contras and the United States was considered overwhelming and incontrovertible.Gill 1989, p. 329 The U.S. played a very large role in financing, training, arming, and advising the Contras over a long period, and it is unlikely that the Contras would have been capable of carrying out significant military operations without this support, given the large amount of training and weapons shipments that the Sandinistas had received from Cuba and the Soviet Union."The United States has played a very large role in financing, training, arming, and advising the Contras over a long period. The Contras only became capable of carrying out significant (para)military operations as a result of this support." As seen at: Gill 1989, p. 329
Political background