In the social sciences, unintended consequences (sometimes unanticipated consequences or unforeseen consequences, more colloquially called knock-on effects) are outcomes of a purposeful action that are not intended or foreseen. The term was popularized in the 20th century by the American sociologist Robert K. Merton.Robert K. Merton, Versatile Sociologist and Father of the Focus Group, Dies at 92, Michael T. Kaufman, The New York Times
Unintended consequences can be grouped into three types: Unexpected benefit: an unexpected benefit (also known as serendipity). Unexpected drawback: an unexpected detrimental effect, occurring in addition to the desired one. For example, while irrigation schemes may provide farmers with water for agriculture, they may also lead to a rise in the prevalence of waterborne diseases such as schistosomiasis. Perverse result: an effect contrary to what was originally intended. For example, while irrigation schemes intended to yields may improve water availability and increase agricultural yields in the short term, they might also lead to soil salination and the depletion of freshwater resources, yields in the long term.
History John Locke The idea of unintended consequences dates back at least to John Locke who discussed the unintended consequences of interest rate regulation in his letter to Sir John Somers, Member of Parliament.John Locke, The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, (London: Rivington, 1824 12th ed.). Vol. 4.
Adam Smith The idea was also discussed by Adam Smith, the Scottish Enlightenment, and consequentialism (judging by results).
The invisible hand theorem is an example of the unintended consequences of agents acting in their self-interest. As Andrew S. Skinner puts it:"The individual undertaker (entrepreneur), seeking the most efficient allocation of resources, contributes to overall economic efficiency; the merchant's reaction to price signals helps to ensure that the allocation of resources accurately reflects the structure of consumer preferences; and the drive to better our condition contributes to economic growth."
Marx and Engels Influenced by 19th century positivism: Por supuesto, la raíz de esta posible mutación dogmática se puede identificar en la concepción de la «ciencia» de Marx, mezcla de Wissenschaft especulativa hegeliana y evolucionismo positivista típico del siglo XIX. [Of course, the root of this possible dogmatic mutation can be identified on Marx's conception of "science", a mix of speculative hegelian Wissenschaft and positivist evolutionism typical of the 19 century.] and Charles Darwin's evolution, for both Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, the idea of uncertainty and chance in social dynamics (and thus unintended consequences beyond results of perfectly defined laws) was only apparent, (if not rejected) since social actions were directed and produced by deliberate human intention.: Es bien conocida la admiración de Marx y Engels por el autor de El origen de las especies y su ambición más o menos explícita de hacer para la evolución social lo que el científico británico había hecho para la evolución natural. Sin embargo, la interpretación de la selección natural por Marx era parcialmente defectiva. Reprochaba a Darwin el rol excesivo otorgado al azar en su esquema de evolución y defendía a veces en modo más bien implícito una especie de lamarckismo sociológico en el que la supuesta función político-ideológica o económica crea inevitablemente el órgano social adecuado en cada etapa del desarrollo de la humanidad. [Marx and Engels admiration for the author of On the Origin of Species and their more or less explicit ambition to do for social evolution what the british scientist did for natural evolution is well known. However, Marx's interpretation of natural selection was partially defective. He reproached Darwin for the excessive role given to chance in his scheme of evolution and defended -sometimes in a more implicit manner- a kind of sociological Lamarckism in which the supposed political-ideological or economic function inevitably creates the adequate social organ on each stage of human [historical] development.]: In the history of society, on the contrary, the actors are all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with deliberation or passion, working towards definite goals; nothing happens without a conscious purpose, without an intended aim.
While discerning between the forces that generate changes in nature and those that generate changes in history in his discussion of Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Engels touched on the idea of (apparent) unintended consequences:
For Karl Marx what can be understood as unintended consequences are actually consequences that should be expected but are obtained unconsciously. These consequences (that no one consciously sought) would be (in the same way as it is for Engels: Engels traces the occurrence of "what no one has willed" exclusively to the fact of conflict among actors: But the unintended consequences arising from diversity of ends, as we have noted already, are sometimes seen as emphatically good; they may be seen (as in Hayek) in the light of immanent spontaneous cooperation, no less than (as in Engels) in the light of destructive contradictions.) product of conflicts that confront actions from countless individuals. The deviation between the original intended goal and the product derived from conflicts would be a marxist equivalent to «unintended consequences.»: "History is made in such a way that the final result always arises from conflicts between many individual wills... Thus there are innumerable intersecting forces, an infinite series of parallelograms of forces, which give rise to one resultant-the historical event... For what each individual wills is obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is something that no one willed. Thus past history proceeds in the manner of a natural process... "
This social conflicts would happen as a result of a competitive society, and also lead society to sabotage itself and prevent historical progress.: [For Marx and Engels] Unintended consequences are a feature not of "history" in general but of "past history", an expression of the inherently self-defeating tendencies of a competitive and inegalitarian society. Thus, historical progress (in Marxist terms) should eliminate these conflicts and make unintended consequences predictable.: If this is so, then we may imagine a future order in which the rational coordination of efforts brings about a course of events which will have been consciously intended.
Austrian School Unintended consequences are a common topic of study and commentary for the Austrian school of economics given its emphasis on methodological individualism. This is to such an extent that unexpected consequences can be considered as a distinctive part of Austrian tenets.: As Caldwell observes, "Menger's Principle of Economics is the founding document of the Austrian School of Economics, [...]" In it, Menger developed what became "fundamental Austrian tenets: the connection between time and error; the causal-genetic or compositive methodological approach; and the notion of unintended consequences".
Carl Menger In "Principles of Economics", Austrian school founder Carl Menger (1840–1921) noted that the relationships that occur in the economy are so intricate that a change in the condition of a single good can have ramifications beyond that good. Menger wrote:
Friedrich Hayek and Catallactics Economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992) is another key figure in the Austrian School of Economics who is notable for his comments on unintended consequences.: [Hayek's] enduring contributions to the study of the unintended consequences of human action are among his most famous achievements. By elaborating that concept, Hayek developed a theory of institutions that spans economics and politics. A full appreciation of Hayek's ideas on unintended consequences would require an essay in its.
In "The Use of Knowledge in Society" (1945) Hayek argues that a centrally planned economy cannot reach the level of efficiency of the free market economy because the necessary (and pertinent) information for decision-making is not concentrated but dispersed among a vast number of agents.:The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. [...] It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. Then, for Hayek, the price system in the free market allows the members of a society to anonymously coordinate for the most efficient use of resources, for example, in a situation of scarcity of a raw material, the price increase would coordinate the actions of an uncountable amount of individuals "in the right direction".: The marvel is that in a case like that of a scarcity of one raw material, without an order being issued, without more than perhaps a handful of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity could not be ascertained by months of investigation, are made to use the material or its products more sparingly; i.e., they move in the right direction.
The development of this system of interactions would allow the progress of society,:The price system is just one of those formations which man has learned to use (though he is still very far from having learned to make the best use of it) after he had stumbled upon it without understanding it. Through it not only a division of labor but also a coordinated utilization of resources based on an equally divided knowledge has become possible. [...] man has been able to develop that division of labor on which our civilization is based because he happened to stumble upon a method which made it possible. and individuals would carry it out without knowing all its implications, given the dispersion (or lack of concentration) of information.:As Alfred Whitehead has said in another connection, "It is a profoundly erroneous truism, [...] that we should cultivate the habit of thinking what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them." This is of profound significance in the social field. We make constant use of formulas, symbols, and rules whose meaning we do not understand and through the use of which we avail ourselves of the assistance of knowledge which individually we do not possess. We have developed these practices and institutions by building upon habits and institutions which have proved successful in their own sphere and which have in turn become the foundation of the civilization we have built up.
The implication of this is that the social order (which derives from social progress, which in turn derives from the economy),: It turns out to be more difficult than may appear at first sight to define what it is that Hayek regards as the "order". Very frequently he refers to it as something "brought about" by multiple exchanges; it is something that "the market system leads to". would be result of a spontaneous cooperation and also an unintended consequence, being born from a process of which no individual or group had all the information available or could know all possible outcomes.