The United Nations Secretary-General selection of 1950 took place as the Cold War turned hot in the Korean War. The Soviet Union vetoed Trygve Lie's second term and offered to vote for any other candidate. However, the United States insisted that Lie had to continue in office as Secretary-General, pressuring its allies to abstain on all other candidates. When a Latin American candidate appeared to have enough votes to win, the United States threatened to use its veto for the first time. After a second round of voting with no candidates receiving the required majority, the Security Council informed the General Assembly that it had been unable to agree on a recommendation. The General Assembly then extended Lie's term for three years.

The 1950 selection is the only time that the General Assembly voted on the office of Secretary-General despite a veto in the Security Council. The Soviet Union considered the vote to be illegal and treated the office of Secretary-General as vacant upon the expiration of Lie's original term. The veto has been respected in all future selections. In the 1996 selection, the United States found itself on the losing side of a 14-1-0 vote recommending Boutros Boutros-Ghali for a second term. Although supporters of Boutros-Ghali pointed to the precedent set by the United States in 1950, other members of the Security Council were unwilling to refer the matter to the General Assembly over a U.S. veto. Boutros-Ghali was forced to suspend his candidacy, becoming the only Secretary-General ever to be denied a second term.

Background

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. Therefore, candidates can be vetoed by permanent members of the Security Council. At the first Secretary-General selection in 1946, the Soviet Union was opposed to Lester Pearson of Canada. The Security Council compromised by selecting Trygvie Lie of Norway as the first Secretary-General of the United Nations.

As the end of his 5-year term approached, Lie's actions drew opposition from both sides of the Cold War. After the Chinese Civil War ended in a Communist victory in 1949, Lie supported the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. The Nationalist Chinese ambassador gave a press conference on 31 May 1950 in which he denounced Lie and threatened to veto him. However, he was willing to extend Lie's term for one year. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union boycotted the United Nations on the grounds that the Chinese seat belonged to Communist China. France indicated that it would vote for Lie if the Soviet Union returned, but it would prefer a different candidate if the Soviet Union had left the United Nations permanently.: Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Ross), June 13, 1950.

The Korean War began on 25 June 1950. Since the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council, it was unable to veto Resolution 83, which called on U.N. member states to send military assistance to South Korea. Lie's strong support of U.N. intervention in Korea made him unacceptable to the Communist countries. The Soviet Union returned to the Security Council in August 1950 when it was their turn to take up the rotating Presidency. Facing the prospect of a Soviet veto, supporters of Lie developed a new legal theory in which the General Assembly did not need a recommendation from the Security Council, since the recommendation from 1946 was still in effect. They also maintained that the General Assembly could extend Lie's term in office without a recommendation from the Security Council.

Support for Lie was lukewarm among the other three permanent members. Lie was "not entirely satisfactory" to the United States, but "he had been generally sympathetic to our views.": Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation New York, October 4, 1950, 9:15 a. m. The United States took the position that the General Assembly could amend its 1946 resolution to extend Lie's term for another five years.: Department of State Position Paper, for the Instruction of the United States Delegation to the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly, August 31, 1950. The United Kingdom wanted to extend Lie's term for no more than two years, which would allow a "more acceptable" Secretary-General to be appointed if the Soviet Union withdrew from the United Nations.: The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State, September 6, 1950, 9 p.m. France favored a one-year extension, but it supported the British position of a two-year maximum.

On 12 September 1950, the British ambassador approached the Soviet ambassador about the Secretary-Generalship.: The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State, September 12, 1950, 4:44 p.m. The United Kingdom was prepared to vote for Arcot Ramasamy Mudaliar or Girija Shankar Bajpai of India if they were acceptable to the Soviet Union. However, Soviet Ambassador Malik was noncommittal, and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky would not meet with the British ambassador.: The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, September 26, 1950, 1:29 p.m.

Lie hoped to receive another five-year term, but he was willing to accept a two-year extension if he were allowed to save face by first declaring that he would "refuse to serve for longer than two years.": The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State, September 11, 1950, 3:51 p.m. Toward the end of September 1950, he grew frustrated with the inaction and threatened to send letters to the Security Council and the General Assembly declaring that he would not be a candidate for re-election. Lie finally agreed not to send those letters, and the United States pressed the United Kingdom and France for a three-year term extension.: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson), October 3, 1950. Lie subsequently declared publicly that he would not serve for more than three years.

First round

Candidates

Candidates for Secretary-General Image Candidate Position Regional group Zygmunt Modzelewski Foreign Minister of Poland Eastern Europe Trygve Lie UN Secretary-General (incumbent) Western Europe

Vote

On 12 October 1950, the Security Council met for a formal vote. Polish Foreign Minister Zygmunt Modzelewski was first rejected by a vote of 1-4-6, with the Soviet Union voting in favor and Nationalist China voting against. Trygve Lie's reappointment was then rejected by a vote of 9-1-1, with the Soviet Union vetoing and Nationalist China abstaining.: Extract From Daily Secret Summary No. 75 From the United States Mission at the United Nations, New York, October 13, 1950, 4:00 a. m.

The General Assembly was called back into session for 19 October 1950. Attempting to avoid the impending vote, Soviet ambassador Yakov Malik called upon U.S. ambassador Warren Austin on 17 October 1950. Austin chided the Soviet Union for "thwarting the will of the majority" and pointed out that Malik had turned down a previous attempt by the United States to consult on the selection. Malik argued that the Security Council had only voted on two candidates so far, and "the cause of peace" would be best served by agreeing on another candidate. However, Austin said that the Soviet Union should serve "the cause of peace" by agreeing to Lie's re-selection. Malik replied that he had received "a firm niet.": Memorandum of Conversation, October 17, 1950.

Second round

Indian compromise proposal

On 18 October 1950, the Security Council met at the request of the Soviet Union. Soviet ambassador Yakov Malik reiterated that the Security Council was not yet deadlocked and should still explore other candidates, "particularly from Latin America and Asia." Indian ambassador Benegal Rau proposed that each member of the Security Council should secretly nominate two candidates. The list of 22 names would then be submitted to the permanent members, who could strike out any names that they found unacceptable. The Security Council would vote on anyone who remained on the list. The British and French ambassadors commended the "ingenious" scheme, and the Nationalist Chinese ambassador found it "satisfactory and fair." Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, and the Soviet Union also favored the Indian plan.: Extract From Daily Secret Summary No. 80 From the United States Mission at the United Nations, New York, October 19, 1950, 1:57 a. m.

The United States opposed the proposal. Austin pointed out that Lie had already received 9 votes, but his name would surely be struck off the list by the Soviet Union. He asked rhetorically, "Is the spoken word without value? Is there no integrity?" Norwegian ambassador Arne Sunde gave an impassioned speech in defense of his fellow countryman, claiming that the elimination of Lie would be "tantamount to a Soviet victory in the Korean War."

Diplomatic maneuverings

The Indian proposal set off a flurry of diplomatic activity as the superpowers appealed for support. The Soviet Union approached several delegations and offered to vote for their candidates. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson pressed other members of the Security Council to hold firm on Lie, saying that allowing him to be vetoed "would damage the prestige of the Security Council by stultifying the clearly expressed majority.": The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, October 18, 1950, 11 p.m.

The British government had already instructed its delegation to abstain on the Indian proposal, but it acquiesced to American wishes by authorizing Jebb to vote against.: The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, October 20, 1950, noon. Although the United States remained worried about the British vote if a Commonwealth citizen were nominated, Jebb had already told the Norwegian ambassador that the UK was "not interested [in] seeing [an] Indian as Secretary General.": The Chargé in Norway (Snow) to the Secretary of State, October 20, 1950, 4 p.m. However, France declined to issue instructions to its U.N. ambassador, allowing him to vote at his own discretion.: The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State, October 20, 1950, 7 p.m.

Cuba told the United States that it would continue to support Lie, although other Latin American governments favored the Indian proposal as "a means of conciliation". The Cuban ambassador suggested that the United States adopt the Indian proposal but exempt Lie's name from being struck off the ballot. Austin denounced the "Soviet maneuver" as a "trick and a trap", saying that the Korean War was "approaching victory" and the U.S. Congress would be hesitant to continue funding the effort with an untested Secretary-General at the helm. He claimed that "this was in no way a threat but simply an analysis of a situation".: Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward P. Maffitt of the United States Delegation Advisory Staff, October 19, 1950.

The Security Council discussed the question on 20 October 1950 and 21 October 1950. The United States, United Kingdom, Cuba, Norway, and Yugoslavia were opposed to the Indian proposal, which left it one vote short of a majority. The Soviet Union then proposed further consultations of the permanent members, which the Security Council agreed to by a bare majority of 7-0-4.: Editorial Note

Candidates

Candidates for Secretary-General Image Candidate Position Regional group Benegal Rau Representative of India on the Security Council Eastern Europe and Asia Charles Malik Ambassador of Lebanon to the U.N. Eastern Europe and Asia Luis Padilla Nervo Ambassador of Mexico to the U.N. Latin America Carlos P. Romulo Former President of U.N. General Assembly Eastern Europe and Asia

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