Operation Formation Star was the code name for the emergency re-deployment of U.S. Seventh Fleet warships to the Sea of Japan off the eastern coast of North Korea following that country's seizure of the in international waters on 23 January 1968.According to the USS Coral Sea 1968 command history, FORMATION STAR was the code name for cold weather training operations conducted in the Sea of Japan.
This surge deployment was the largest build-up of U.S. naval forces around the Korean Peninsula since the end of the Korean War. Still, Operation Formation Star placed considerable strain on the Seventh Fleet's support for the Vietnam War during the Tet Offensive, particularly its aircraft carrier operations at Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Operation Formation Star was executed in conjunction with Operation Combat Fox, a surge deployment of additional land-based combat aircraft squadrons to the U.S. Fifth Air Force in the Far East. Additionally, the Pueblo Crisis saw a limited presidential-authorized call-up of U.S.-based units of the Naval Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard to active duty, the first such call-up since the Berlin Crisis of 1961.
Although a wide range of military options were considered, the Johnson Administration elected to resolve the Pueblo crisis diplomatically, with Operation Formation Star helping to provide a "measured show of force" during the Pueblo crisis.Mobley. Flash Point North Korea, p. 53.
Background
Tensions along the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ) Also referred to as the Second Korean War, the Korean DMZ Conflict was a series of low-level armed clashes between North Korean forces and the forces of South Korea and the United States, largely occurring between 1966 and 1969 at the Korean DMZ. The number of incidents along the DMZ jumped from 37 in 1966 to 435 in 1967, with a combined 1967 total of 371 fatalities involving North Korea, South Korea, and United Nations forces while there were no fatalities in 1966 (see chart).The final total for 1968 was 542; and for 1969, it was 99 (not shown).Mobley. Flash Point North Korea, pp. 14 (Table 1), 149 (Table 8). Also, during 1967, there were two sabotage attempts to disrupt South Korea railroad operations, the first such attempts since the end of the Korean War. Additionally, in 1967, a South Korean patrol vessel was sunk by North Korea shore batteries over a fishing dispute, with thirty-nine of the 79-man crew killed.Mobley. Flash Point North Korea, pp. 14–15.
Finally, in the most overt incident to date, North Korean commandos from Unit 124 unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the South Korea president Park Chung Hee at the presidential residence Blue House in Seoul, South Korea, on 21 January 1968.
Operation Clickbeetle Operation Clickbeetle was the code-name for United States electronic and radio intelligence-gathering operations by small converted coastal cargo ships that operated close to potential enemies' coastline in international waters. The first vessel in this program was and the second was the Pueblo. Beginning in 1965, the Banner completed fifteen intelligence missions involving the Soviet Union and China, with only three missions that also included North Korea. While both China and the Soviet Union in particular challenged Banners presence off their coasts, the North Koreans virtually ignored the U.S. vessel. Banner and Pueblo were under the direct operational control of the Commander, Naval Forces Japan Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson through the Task Force 96 command staff.Mobley, Flash Point North Korea, pp. 22–23, 28–29.Cheevers. Act of War, pp. 30–32.
Operational summary On 11 January 1968, USS Pueblo left Sasebo, Japan, and headed northward through the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of Japan. Pueblos specific orders were to intercept and conduct surveillance of Soviet Pacific Fleet activity in the Tsushima Strait and to gather signal and electronic intelligence from North Korea. To maintain a low profile, no naval escort was provided nor were any land-based interceptor jets on stand-by alert for Pueblos mission. After an uneventful mission to date, Pueblo was observed by a North Korea sub-chaser on 21 January 1968 in international waters off Wonsan. On 23 January 1968, the Pueblo was shadowed by two North Korea fishing trawlers before being intercepted and boarded by a North Korean SO1 class submarine chaser and three P 4-class torpedo boats, all outside North Korea's territorial waters.Mobley, Flash Point North Korea, pp. 24, 28, 39, 40–42.
Initial response
On the day of the Pueblos seizure, 23 January 1968, the closest U.S. naval force was Task Group 77.5 under the command of Rear Admiral Horace H. Epes, Jr. (pictured),Admiral Epes was also Commander Carrier Division 1 (ComCarDiv1). consisting of the nuclear-powered attack aircraft carrier , the nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate , and the guided-missile frigate . At the time of the initial alert, the task group was steaming in the East China Sea en route to Yankee Station off North Vietnam; it was approximately from the last reported position of the Pueblo or from Wonsan, the nearest North Korean seaport to Pueblo.Mobley. Flash Point North Korea, pp. 43–44.Cheevers. Act of War, pp. 77–79. Now re-designated Task Group 70.6, the Enterprise task group was ordered to proceed "at best speed" to the southern entrance of the Tsushima Strait. Also, the Pueblos sister-ship, Banner, was ordered to suspend its intelligence-gathering mission and return to Yokosuka, Japan, immediately.Mobley. Flash Point North Korea, p. 45–46.
A number of factors prevented an immediate response from the Enterprises embarked Carrier Air Wing Nine of 85 aircraft.Carrier Air Wing Nine (CVW-9) consisted of 26 F-4 Phantom II jet fighters, 26 A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft, six RA-5 recon aircraft, 15 A-6 Intruders all-weather attack bombers, five A-3 Skywarrior ELINT aircraft, four E-2 Hawkeye AEW aircraft, and three SH-2 Seasprite helicopters. The air wing's aircraft had sustained damage from a recent typhoon and those remaining 35 operational strike aircraft had to be re-spotted on the flight deck and armed with air-to-surface ordnance.Mobley. Flash Point North Korea, p. 44. Additionally, the ship could not stage replacement aircraft through Japan due to the status of forces agreement that prohibited the combat use of U.S. military aircraft re-deployed from a neutral nation. Another factor was that Wonsan was protected by 14 anti-aircraft batteries, two surface-to-air missile sites, and up to 75 MiG fighters.Cheevers. Act of War, p. 78.
Later on 23 January 1968, CINCPAC Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Jr., requested authorization from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for Task Group 70.6 to carry out photographic reconnaissance of Wonsan to determine the location of the Pueblo.Mobley. Flash Point North Korea, pp. 45–46. Upon hearing about the seizure of the Pueblo, Admiral John J. Hyland, Jr., recognized the possibility of sending a warship into Wonsan harbor to board and recapture the Pueblo.Cheevers . Act of War, p. 108. Accordingly, Hyland directed his U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters staff to order the U.S. Seventh Fleet to divert a destroyer and "prepare to engage in operations that may include towing Pueblo and/or retrieval of Pueblo crew/provide air cover as appropriate." Vice Admiral William F. Bringle ordered his Seventh Fleet staff to deploy the destroyer (pictured) to Wonsan as a contingency for such an operation, with a second destroyer to be sent as a back-up.Mobley. Flash Point North Korea, p. 46. Additionally, on that same date, Lieutenant General Seth J. McKee, of the Fifth Air Force ordered a strike force of twelve F-105 fighter-bombers to Osan Air Base in South Korea with orders to sink the Pueblo in Wonsan harbor.Mobley. "Pueblo: A Retrospective," p. 9.Cheevers. Act of War, pp. 79–81, 89–92, 347.The strike force was ordered to stand down three days later. See Cheevers. Act of War, p. 129.
Early on 24 January 1968, the U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters ordered Task Group 70.6 to remain below the 36th parallel North (Defender Station) and take "no overt action until further informed." Subsequent orders directed the Enterprise task group to the Korea Strait, and to gain additional sea room, the task group temporarily withdrew to the East China Sea. Land-based anti-submarine patrols in support of Task Group 70.6 were limited to a two-plane barrier patrol. Additionally, all signal intelligence-gathering flights over the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan were temporarily suspended until further notice. Finally, the Higbee was recalled from the Wonsan area.Mobley. Flash Point North Korea, p. 47.
On the evening of 25 January 1968, a high-altitude A-12 reconnaissance aircraft overflew Wonsan harbor and confirmed that the Pueblo was anchored there and surrounded by North Korean naval vessels (pictured above).Mobley. Flash Point North Korea, p. 54.Cheevers. Act of War, p. 114.
Crisis management
The U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Pacific Fleet planning staffs offered a number of military options in response to the Pueblo crisis. These options were forwarded to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the rest of the National Command Authority apparatus while the U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Fifth Air Force command staffs developed contingency plans.Mobley. "Pueblo: A Retrospective," pp. 107–111.Mobley. Flash Point North Korea, pp. 59–63.
On Wednesday morning, 24 January 1968, Rear Admiral William McClendon, the deputy director for Operations (J-3) on the Joint Staff, reported back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (pictured) about the disposition and availability of military forces in the vicinity fn the Korean peninsula, as well as offering the following four recommendations:
Demand the return of the Pueblo and its crew via U.N.-DPRK talks at Panmunjom. Send an unarmed tugboat to Wonsan to retrieve the Pueblo. Conduct air-naval show of force off Wonsan. Execute selective air strikes against North Korea military and industrial targets.
The J-3 report emphasized that option 4 must be a prerequisite before options 2 and 3 can be considered, and that other potential options, such as the seizure of North Korean naval and merchant marine ships on the high seas, offered a "small chance of success, half measures, and less worthiness than should be expected of a great power." The Joints Chiefs met later that day to consider how any mobilization to meet this unfolding Pueblo crisis would affect U.S. military operations in Vietnam.
On Friday, 26 January 1968, the inter-agency Korea Working Group met to discuss the Pueblo crisis, which included consideration of the following military, diplomatic, and economic options:
Selected air strikes on North Korea. This option involved ninety-two U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and South Korean air force aircraft striking the North Korean air base at Wonsan and the near-by Munp'yong-ni naval base. Naval blockade of Wonsan. Leveraging carrier-based air cover, U.S. and possibly South Korean naval units could impose a blockade within Wonsan's twelve-mile limit. To achieve air superiority, strikes against North Korean military airfields would "quite possibly" be required. Mine Wonsan Harbor. Carrier-based A-6 attack aircraft would fly seventeen sorties to drop eighty-three mines in one night, and thereafter the A-6 aircraft would "reseed" the minefield as necessary. Seize North Korean vessels. The option would act as retaliation in kind, seizing either a North Korean merchant vessel or a warship, and then using that vessel as a bargaining chip for the release of the Pueblo and its crew.