The 125th Rifle Division was formed as an infantry division of the Red Army on August 19, 1939, in the Urals Military District, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of the following month. After a short stay in the far north it was moved to western Belarus in April 1940 and by the start of Operation Barbarossa it had been assigned to 8th Army in what was soon named Northwestern Front. It was directly in the path of part of 4th Panzer Group but managed to escape encirclement and retreated through Lithuania and Estonia through July and August, suffering heavy casualties in the process. After escaping encirclement near Tartu it continued falling back toward Leningrad, helping to form the Oranienbaum Bridgehead before being transferred into the defenses of the city itself, now as part of Leningrad Front's 55th Army. Under this command it took part in several abortive efforts to break the siege in the Kolpino area from October to December, during which its original commander was killed. During 1942 and 1943 it was engaged in holding the lines, mostly as part of 42nd Army, until January 1944 when it took part in the final offensive to drive Army Group North away from the city, quickly winning a battle honor and then the Order of the Red Banner, the latter as part of 2nd Shock Army. It then came up against the defenses of the city of Narva, and was moved from 2nd Shock to 59th Army to 8th Army during this lengthy battle. After a period of rebuilding in Leningrad Front reserves it returned to 2nd Shock for the renewed offensive into Estonia, during which several of its subunits received distinctions for the capture of Tallinn. Following this, it was removed to the Reserve of the Supreme High Command and reassigned to 21st Army, which reinforced 1st Ukrainian Front prior to the winter offensive into Poland and Germany. The 125th saw extensive service in Silesia, winning the Order of Kutuzov, while its subunits also received several decorations. At the time of the German surrender it was advancing toward Prague. The division was disbanded in July.
Formation The division was formed at Kirov in the Urals Military District on August 19, 1939. Kombrig Pavel Petrovich Bogaychuk, who had recently graduated from the Frunze Military Academy while also serving as deputy commandant for combat training, Sverdlovsk Infantry School, was given command the same day; he would have his rank modernized to that of major general on June 5, 1940. In February 1940 the division began moving by rail to Arkhangelsk, where it came under the SGK Reserve, but was soon moved again to western Belarus, with its headquarters at Pinsk. At the start of the German invasion on June 22, 1941, it was part of 8th Army's 11th Rifle Corps in the Baltic Special Military District (soon redesignated as Northwestern Front).Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 7 At this time its order of battle was as follows: 466th Rifle Regiment 657th Rifle Regiment 749th Rifle Regiment 414th Light Artillery Regiment 459th Howitzer Artillery Regiment (until September 21, 1941)Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 63 183rd Antitank Battalion (from June 22 to September 21, 1941, then from January 14, 1942) 348th Antiaircraft Battery (later 345th Battalion, until May 25, 1943) 390th Mortar Battalion (from October 17, 1941, until August 15, 1942) 196th Machine Gun Battalion (from August 17, 1942, until May 25, 1943) 165th Reconnaissance Battalion [included a company of light tanks] (later 165th Company) 189th Sapper Battalion 191st Signal Battalion (later 204th Signal Battalion, 204th Signal Company) 147th Medical/Sanitation Battalion 272nd Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company (later 125th) 210th Motor Transport Company (later 206th) 331st Field Bakery (later 126th) 22nd Divisional Veterinary Hospital 70th Divisional Artillery Workshop 996th Field Postal Station (later 853rd) 678th Field Office of the State Bank At this time it was on the left-center of its Army, tying into its Corps-mate, the 48th Rifle Division, on its left, and the 90th Rifle Division of 10th Rifle Corps on the right, well to the west of Raseiniai.Artyom Drabkin & Alexei Isaev, Barbarossa Through Soviet Eyes, trans. C. Summerville, Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., Barnsley, UK, 2012, p. xi General Bogaychuk had his headquarters southwest of Batakiai, with elements of the division spread along the German border on the line PagramantisTauragėGaurėSkaudvilė,Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 63 a line up to 40km in length. This placed it directly in the path of XXXXI Motorized Corps and the 269th Infantry Division.Drabkin & Isaev, Barbarossa Through Soviet Eyes, p. xi The division had the 51st Corps Artillery Regiment in support.
The District commander, Col. Gen. F. I. Kuznetsov, had disregarded the instructions of the NKO and General Staff to avoid any action that might be taken as a provocation. On June 15, alarmed by intelligence reports of the German buildup, issued orders to increase force readiness along the frontier. Without directly mentioning the buildup he stated, "Today, as never before, we must be fully combat ready. Many commanders do not understand this. But all must firmly and clearly understand that at any moment we must be ready to fulfill any combat mission." After receiving further intelligence two days later Kuznetsov ordered his forces to full military readiness on June 18. While his actions were brave in going against orders from the top and militarily correct, it's unlikely that they made any real difference when the war began.David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1998, pp. 104-05
General Bogaychuk fully concurred with Kuznetsov's directives and did his best to prepare his soldiers. On July 21 he issued his own orders to place mines on the roads, bridges, and probable approach routes of tanks, while also strengthening security and increasing reconnaissance measures. These actions enhanced the resistance of the 125th in the opening days.Aleksander A. Maslov, Fallen Soviet Generals, ed. & trans. D. M. Glantz, Frank Cass Publishers, London, UK, 1998, p. 38
Baltic Operation The invasion began with an artillery preparation at 0310 hours. In the initial hours the 90th Division was partially surrounded and its commander was killed in action. The 48th, with its main forces marching from the Riga area, had only forward detachments near the frontier, leaving the 125th to hold the line largely alone. Overnight the 1st and 6th Panzer Divisions had crossed the Neman River without being detected by Soviet intelligence and went over to the attack after just five minutes of artillery fire. However, according to Colonel Ritgen of 6th Panzer,Another senior officer of 6th Panzer, E. Raus, noted that after crossing the border south of Tauragė and clearing the village of Siline one of his combat groups reached "a forest east of this place, [where] two Russian companies put up an exceptionally strong fight. Our infantry managed to neutralize the last pocket of resistance only at 16.00 hours, after a fierce action in the forest." Meanwhile, the 48th was caught on the march and suffered 70 percent casualties to armor and air attacks.Drabkin & Isaev, Barbarossa Through Soviet Eyes, pp. 38-39 By contrast, Sr. Lt. Kolegaev's artillery battalion of the 414th Regiment was credited with 30 panzers destroyed, and the battery of Lt. Yatsenko accounted for another seven.Maslov, Fallen Soviet Generals, p. 38
1st Panzer, on the left flank of the 6th, attacked straight off the march and reached Tauragė by 1300 hours, where it took a pair of bridges over the Jūra River. However, the town was defended by the 657th Regiment, under command of Major Georgievskii, and street fighting soon erupted, eventually requiring the panzer pioneers to employ flamethrowers and demolition charges. By 2400 the remaining defenders had been forced into the northeastern outskirts.Drabkin & Isaev, Barbarossa Through Soviet Eyes, pp. 39-40 The 749th had fallen back to a line held by the 9th Antitank Artillery Brigade by evening, while the 466th, having suffered some 40 percent losses, was reorganizing near Skaudvilė. During the next day the division, along with 9th Antitank, plus survivors of the 48th and the 2nd Tank Division, fought with some success near Raseiniai before the 125th withdrew under orders toward Šiauliai.
By July 1 the division had crossed to the north bank of the Daugava River, with some 700 "bayonets" (riflemen and sappers) still on strength. A strength return on July 4 broke this down as: 466th Regiment - 210 men, one 45mm antitank gun, three heavy machine guns; 657th Regiment - 185 men, two 76mm regimental guns, one antiaircraft machine gun, two heavy machine guns; 749th Regiment - 250 men, one 76mm gun, eight mortars, two antiaircraft machine guns; 414th Light Artillery Regiment - 35 men, one 76mm cannon; 459th Howitzer Artillery Regiment - eight guns total; 165th Reconnaissance Battalion - 15 men, two tankettes. A week later the situation had improved considerably. Bogaychuk reported to 11th Corps that the division had a total of 3,145 personnel, armed with 53 machine guns of all types, seven 45mm antitank guns, plus 22 other guns and mortars. At the time this was above average for Northwestern Front, where most rifle divisions had less than 2,000 troops.
Leningrad strategic defensive
By July 9 the division had been forced back to the north bank of the Emajõgi River, where it took up defensive positions. German attacks were renewed on July 22 and 11th Corps found itself encircled before breaking out near Tartu two days later. By August 1 8th Army had been subordinated to Northern Front (as of August 27 Leningrad Front),Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, pp. 30, 39 and 11th Corps was disbanded on August 15. What remained of the 125th retreated through Narva and along the south coast of the Gulf of Finland. Starting on August 16 and for the next six days the XXXXI Corps struck repeatedly at the approaches to the fortified region around Krasnogvardeisk, but was unable to crack the defenses. In the same period infantry forces of Army Group North took Kingisepp, forcing 8th Army back to the west bank of the Luga River by August 21. The Army commander, Lt. Gen. P. S. Pshennikov, reported that his five divisions had lost all their regimental and battalion commanders in this fighting.Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2002, pp. 60-61
The Army remained a sizable threat to the left flank of XXXXI Corps, and the Army Group suspended the attacks at Krasnogvardeisk until 18th Army could deal with the situation. This took the form of a combined attack by XXVI and XXVIII Army Corps toward the Gulf during August 22-25. By September 1 this had pushed 8th Army back to new defenses south of Oranienbaum, forming a bridgehead that Soviet forces would hold until 1944. Between August 21 and September 9 the 18th Army took 9,774 prisoners while capturing or destroying 60 tanks and 77 artillery pieces. Despite this shambles 8th Army held. On September 8 German forces captured Shlisselburg to the east of Leningrad, cutting land communications from the city to the rest of the USSR. The following day Army Gen. G. K. Zhukov took command of Leningrad Front.Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 61, 69, 75
Siege of Leningrad