was an admiral of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the commander of the Combined Fleet during World War II. He commanded the fleet from 1939 until his death in 1943, overseeing the start of the Pacific War in 1941 and Japan's initial successes and defeats before his plane was shot down by U.S. fighter aircraft over New Guinea.
Yamamoto graduated from the Imperial Naval Academy in 1904 and served in the Russo-Japanese War, where he lost two fingers at the Battle of Tsushima. He later studied at Harvard University in the United States and was appointed naval attaché to the Japanese embassy in Washington. His experiences convinced him that naval power depended on access to oil and industrial capacity, and that Japan thus had little hope to defeat the U.S. in a war. He was one of the first naval leaders to conclude that naval aviation and aircraft carriers would play a decisive role in any future conflict.
In 1936, Yamamoto was appointed navy vice minister, and opposed Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Pact of 1940. In 1939, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, and was tasked with creating a strategy for war with the United States; Yamamoto favored a surprise attack, which was carried out at the start of the war with an attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
In the early months of the war, the Japanese fleet scored a series of decisive naval victories. These gains were halted at the Battle of Midway in June 1942, in which four Japanese carriers were sunk. Yamamoto committed to the defense of the Solomon Islands in the Guadalcanal campaign, but was unable to prevent their capture. In April 1943, Yamamoto was killed after American code breakers intercepted his flight plans, enabling the United States Army Air Forces to shoot down his aircraft.
Family background Yamamoto was born as in Nagaoka, Niigata. His father, Sadayoshi Takano (高野 貞吉), had been an intermediate-rank samurai of the Nagaoka Domain. "Isoroku" is a Japanese term meaning "56"; the name referred to his father's age at Isoroku's birth. Isoroku was the 6th son and 7th child of Sadayoshi. His mother was Sadayoshi's third wife. The three wives were sisters; the first two died young. It was common at the time for a widower to marry the younger sister of a wife who died.
In 1916, Isoroku was adopted into the Yamamoto family (another family of former Nagaoka samurai) and took the Yamamoto name. It was a common practice for samurai families lacking sons to adopt suitable young men in this fashion to carry on the family name, the rank and the income that went with it. Isoroku married Reiko Mihashi in 1918; they had two sons and two daughters.
Early career
Yamamoto graduated from the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy in 1904, ranking 11th in his class.Hickman, Kennedy, World War II: Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto He then subsequently served as a signalman on the armored cruiser during the Russo-Japanese War. He was wounded at the Battle of Tsushima, suffering a wound "the size of a baby's head" on his thigh and losing his index and middle fingers on his left hand, in an explosion in the ship's forward turret. It appeared the explosion was not the result of Russian fire but of the gun itself exploding. He returned to the Naval Staff College in 1914, emerging as a lieutenant commander in 1916. In December 1919, he was promoted to commander.
1920s and 1930s
Yamamoto was part of the Japanese Navy establishment, who were rivals of the more aggressive Army establishment, especially the officers of the Kwantung Army. He promoted a policy of a strong fleet to project force through gunboat diplomacy, rather than a fleet used primarily for the transport of invasion land forces, as some of his political opponents in the Army wanted.Making of Japanese Manchuria, Matsusaka This stance led him to oppose the invasion of China. He also opposed war against the United States, partly because of his studies at Harvard University (1919–1921)Lessons in Surprise, by Primus V (Harvard Magazine, July–August 2010)This article explains research done by Harvard alum Seymour Morris Jr who wrote of Yamamoto being taught the game of poker by his Harvard classmates and becoming very good at winning, then using his winnings to hitchhike across America and learn more broadly about the country. He continued his poker playing and travels through the country while on assignment as an attaché at the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C. and his two postings as a naval attaché (1919-1921, concurrent with studying at Harvard; and 1926-1928) in Washington, D.C., where he learned to speak fluent English. Yamamoto traveled extensively in the United States during his tour of duty there, where he studied American customs and business practices.
He was promoted to captain in 1923. On February 13, 1924, Captain Yamamoto was part of the Japanese delegation visiting the United States Naval War College. Later that year, he changed his specialty from gunnery to naval aviation. His first command was the cruiser in 1928, followed by the aircraft carrier .
He participated in the London Naval Conference 1930 as a rear admiral and the London Naval Conference 1935 as a vice admiral, as the growing military influence on the government at the time deemed that a career military specialist needed to accompany the diplomats to the arms limitations talks. Yamamoto was a strong proponent of naval aviation and served as head of the Aeronautics Department, before accepting a post as commander of the First Carrier Division. Yamamoto opposed the Japanese invasion of northeast China in 1931, the subsequent full-scale land war with China in 1937, and the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in 1940. As Deputy Navy Minister, he apologized to United States Ambassador Joseph C. Grew for the bombing of the gunboat USS Panay in December 1937. These issues made him a target of assassination threats by pro-war militarists.
Throughout 1938, many young army and naval officers began to speak publicly against Yamamoto and certain other Japanese admirals, such as Mitsumasa Yonai and Shigeyoshi Inoue, for their strong opposition to a tripartite pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, which the admirals saw as inimical to "Japan's natural interests". Yamamoto received a steady stream of hate mail and death threats from Japanese nationalists. His reaction to the prospect of death by assassination was passive and accepting. The admiral wrote:
The Japanese Army, annoyed at Yamamoto's unflinching opposition to a Rome-Berlin-Tokyo treaty, dispatched military police to "guard" him, a ruse by the Army to keep an eye on him. He was later reassigned from the naval ministry to sea as the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet on August 30, 1939. This was done as one of the last acts of acting Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, under Baron Hiranuma Kiichirō's short-lived administration. It was done partly to make it harder for assassins to target Yamamoto. Yonai was certain that if Yamamoto remained ashore, he would be killed before the year ended.
1940–1941
Yamamoto was promoted to admiral on November 15, 1940. That was in spite of the fact that when Hideki Tojo was appointed prime minister on October 18, 1941, many political observers thought that Yamamoto's career was essentially over. Tojo had been Yamamoto's opponent from the time when the latter served as Japan's deputy naval minister and Tojo was the prime mover behind Japan's takeover of Manchuria.
It was believed that Yamamoto would be appointed to command the Yokosuka Naval Base, "a nice safe demotion with a big house and no power at all". However, after a brief stint in the post, a new Japanese cabinet was announced, and Yamamoto found himself returned to his position of power despite his open conflict with Tojo and other members of the Army's oligarchy, who favored war with the European powers and the United States.
Two of the main reasons for Yamamoto's political survival were his immense popularity within the fleet, where he commanded the respect of his men and officers, and his close relations with the imperial family. He also had the acceptance of Japan's naval hierarchy:
Consequently, Yamamoto stayed in his post. With Tojo now in charge of Japan's highest political office, it became clear the Army would lead the Navy into a war about which Yamamoto had serious reservations. He wrote to an ultranationalist:
This quote was spread by the militarists, minus the last sentence, so it was interpreted in America as a boast that Japan would conquer the entire continental United States. The omitted sentence showed Yamamoto's counsel of caution about a war that could cost Japan dearly. Nevertheless, Yamamoto accepted the reality of impending war and planned for a quick victory by destroying the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in a preventive strike, while simultaneously thrusting into the oil- and rubber-rich areas of Southeast Asia, especially the Dutch East Indies, Borneo, and Malaya. In naval matters, Yamamoto opposed the building of the battleships and as an unwise investment of resources.
Yamamoto was responsible for a number of innovations in Japanese naval aviation. Although remembered for his association with aircraft carriers, Yamamoto did more to influence the development of land-based naval aviation, particularly the Mitsubishi G3M and G4M medium bombers. His demand for great range and the ability to carry a torpedo was intended to conform to Japanese conceptions of bleeding the American fleet as it advanced across the Pacific. The planes did achieve considerable range, but long-range fighter escorts were not available. The planes were lightly constructed and, when fully fueled, were vulnerable to enemy fire. That earned the G4M the sardonic nickname the "flying cigarette lighter". Yamamoto eventually died in one of those aircraft.
The range of the G3M and G4M contributed to a demand for great range in a fighter aircraft. That partly drove the requirements for the A6M Zero, which was as noteworthy for its range as for its maneuverability. Again, both attributes were achieved only with light construction and flammability, that later contributed to the A6M's high casualty rates as the war progressed.
As Japan moved toward a wider war during 1940, Yamamoto began to consider strategic as well as tactical innovation, again with mixed results. Prompted by talented young officers such as Lieutenant Commander Minoru Genda, Yamamoto approved the reorganization of Japanese carrier forces into the First Air Fleet, a consolidated striking force that gathered Japan's six largest carriers into one unit. That innovation provided great striking capacity, but also concentrated the vulnerable carriers into a compact target. Yamamoto also oversaw the organization of a similar large land-based organization in the 11th Air Fleet, which later used the G3M and G4M to neutralize American air forces in the Philippines and sink the British Force Z.
In January 1941, Yamamoto went even further and proposed a radical revision of Japanese naval strategy. For two decades, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred T. Mahan,Mahan, The Influence of Seapower on History the Naval General Staff had planned in terms of Japanese light surface forces, submarines, and land-based air units whittling down the American fleet as it advanced across the Pacific until the Japanese Navy engaged it in a climactic Kantai Kessen ("decisive battle") in the northern Philippine Sea (between the Ryukyu Islands and the Marianas), with battleships fighting in traditional battle lines.