There are various rationales that have been used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Iraq War, and subsequent hostilities.
The George W. Bush administration began actively pressing for military intervention in Iraq in late 2001. The primary rationalization for the Iraq War was articulated by a joint resolution of the United States Congress known as the Iraq Resolution. The United States intent was to "disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people".
In the lead-up to the invasion, the United States and the United Kingdom falsely claimed that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction, covertly supporting al-Qaeda, and that he presented a threat to Iraq's neighbors and to the world community. According to the Center for Public Integrity, eight senior-level officials in the Bush administration issued at least 935 false statements in the two years leading up to the war. The US stated, "On 8 November 2002; the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441. All 15 members of the Security Council agreed to give Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its obligations and disarm or face the serious consequences of failing to disarm. The resolution strengthened the mandate of the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), giving them the authority to go anywhere, at any time, and talk to anyone in order to verify Iraq's disarmament."UN Security Council Resolution 1441 Retrieved 30 January 2008
From late 2001 to early 2003, the Bush administration worked to build a case for invading Iraq, culminating in then-Secretary of State Colin Powell's February 2003 address to the Security Council. Shortly after the invasion, the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence agencies put forward information which discredited evidence related to Iraqi weapons as well as alleged links to al-Qaeda. The Bush and Blair administrations provided secondary rationales for the war, such as the Saddam Hussein government's human rights record and promoting democracy in Iraq.
Opinion polling showed that people of nearly all countries opposed a war without a UN mandate. Similar polling showed that the perception of the United States as a danger to world peace had significantly increased. UN secretary-general Kofi Annan described the war as illegal, saying in a September 2004 interview that it was "not in conformity with the Security Council". The US led the effort for "the redirection of former Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) scientists, technicians, and engineers to civilian employment and discourage emigration of this community from Iraq".Redirection of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Experts Short-term Program Retrieved 30 January 2008
The US officially declared the end of its combat role in Iraq on the 31 August 2010. Several thousand troops remained in the country until all American troops were withdrawn from Iraq by December 2011. In June 2014, US forces returned to Iraq due to an escalation of instability in the region. In June 2015 the number of American ground troops totaled 3,550. Between December 2011 and June 2014, Department of Defense officials estimated that there were 200 to 300 personnel based at the US embassy in Baghdad.
Background The Gulf War had never officially ended due to the lack of an armistice to formally end it. As a result, relations between the United States, the United Nations, and Iraq remained strained. Saddam Hussein issued formal statements renouncing his invasion of Kuwait and made reparation payments following the Gulf War. The US and the United Nations maintained a policy of "containment" towards Iraq, which involved economic sanctions, Iraqi no-fly zones enforced by the United States, United Kingdom, and France (until it ended its no-fly zone operations in 1998) and ongoing inspections of Iraqi weapons programs. In 2002, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441 demanding that Iraq "comply with its disarmament obligations" and allow weapon inspections. Iraq war critics such as former weapons inspector Scott Ritter claimed that these sanctions and weapon inspection policies, supported by both the Bush and Clinton administrations, were actually intended to foster regime change in Iraq.Scott Ritter and Seymour Hersh: Iraq Confidential Retrieved 30 January 2008
US policy shifted in 1998 when the Iraq Liberation Act was passed in the United States Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton. The bill was proposed after Iraq terminated its cooperation with UN weapons inspectors in the preceding August. The act made it official US policy to "support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power", although it also made clear that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces".H.R.4655 Retrieved 30 January 2008 This legislation contrasted with the terms set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which made no mention of regime change.
One month after the passage of the "Iraq Liberation Act", the US and UK launched a bombardment of Iraq named Operation Desert Fox. The stated rationale of this campaign was to hamper the Saddam Hussein government's ability to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. US National Security personnel also reportedly hoped it would help weaken Saddam Hussein's grip on power.Arkin, William. "The Difference Was in the Details". The Washington Post, January 17, 1999; Page B1. Retrieved from on 23 April 2007.
The Republican Party's 2000 campaign platform called for the 'full implementation' of the Iraq Liberation Act and the removal of Saddam Hussein. Key Bush advisers, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld's deputy Paul Wolfowitz, were longtime advocates of an invasion of Iraq. They contributed to a September 2000 report from the Project for the New American Century, which argued that an invasion of Iraq would enable the US to 'play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security.'. After leaving the administration, former Bush treasury secretary Paul O'Neill said that "contingency planning" for an attack on Iraq had been undergoing since the inauguration and that the first National Security Council meeting discussed an invasion. Retired Army General Hugh Shelton, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he saw nothing to indicate the United States was close to attacking Iraq early in Bush's term. Despite key Bush advisers' stated interest in invading Iraq, little formal movement towards an invasion occurred until the 11 September 2001 attacks.
Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Bush administration national security team actively considered an invasion of Iraq. According to aides accompanying Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the National Military Command Center on 11 September, Rumsfeld asked for: "best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit Saddam Hussein at same time. Not only Osama bin Laden." On the evening of 12 September, President Bush ordered White House counter-terrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to investigate possible Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 attacks. The administration believed that an attack as devastating as 9/11 involved a state sponsor."Frontline: The Dark Side," PBS, aired June 20, 2006
[COLL]. ...a lot of the Republicans in Bush's administration hadn't been in government effectively since the Cold War period, ... and so in the Cabinet, there was a natural inclination to think that an attack of this scale, this power, this sophistication, had to have roots in state sponsorship, not only because there was a natural willingness to believe that Iraq would be interested in carrying out such an attack, but also because this was a group of people whose experience of terrorism led them to believe that it was almost always state-sponsored in some sense.
[SCHEUER]. Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Cheney all cut their teeth in the Cold War, in the contest between nation-states. They're not comfortable with thinking that the world's greatest power can be threatened by a couple of Arabs with long beards, squatting around a desert campfire in Afghanistan. It doesn't register." Clarke and the US intelligence community were of the opinion that Iraq had no major ties to Al-Qaeda or to the attacks, and that what few contacts existed were Iraq's attempts to monitor the group."Frontline: The Dark Side," PBS, aired June 20, 2006
Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld expressed skepticism towards the CIA's intelligence. They questioned whether the CIA were competent enough to produce accurate information as the agency underestimated threats and failed to accurately predict events such as the Iranian Revolution, the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Further, concerns were also raised by General Tommy Franks, regarding the lack of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in the CENTCOM region. They instead preferred outside analysis and intelligence supplied by the Iraqi National Congress (INC), headed by Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi, as well as unvetted pieces of intelligence. This information claimed that Iraq had ties to Al-Qaeda via Iraqi intelligence, as well as jointly pursuing WMD development with them.
A memo written by Secretary Rumsfeld, dated 27 November 2001, considers a US–Iraq war. One section of the memo lists multiple possible justifications for a US–Iraq War. The administration decided to defer an invasion of Iraq in favor of an invasion of Afghanistan."Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine" . PBS.org. Retrieved on 15 May 2007. President Bush, in a January 2002 State of the Union address, decried Iraq was a member of the Axis of Evil stating "The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.""The President's State of the Union Address" . Office of the Press Secretary, 29 January 2002. Over the next year, the Bush administration began pushing for international support for an invasion of Iraq. This campaign culminated in Secretary of State Colin Powell's 5 February 2003 presentation to the United Nations Security Council."U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council" . 5 February 2003. Prior to this campaign, the Bush Administration were informed by the intelligence community that Iraq had no nuclear weapons, that there was no information about whether Iraq had biological weapons, and that Iraq had no ties to Al-Qaeda.Vox, 9 July 2016, "No, Really, George W. Bush Lied about WMDs" Center for American Progress (29 January 2004) "In Their Own Words: Iraq's 'Imminent' Threat" americanprogress.orgSenator Bill Nelson (28 January 2004) "New Information on Iraq's Possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction", Congressional Record
After failing to gain UN support for an additional UN authorization, the US, together with the UK and small contingents from Australia, Poland, and Denmark, launched an invasion on 20 March 2003 under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 660 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 678. A 2008 study conducted by the Center for Public Integrity and Foundation for Independent Journalism revealed that between September 2001 and September 2003, George W. Bush and seven senior officials in his administration issued explicit statements on at least 532 occasions claiming that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or had established covert alliances with Al-Qaeda, or both. The study concluded that these statements were issued by the American government as part of an "orchestrated campaign" to generate jingoistic attitudes in the United States for the purpose of initiating a war based on "false pretenses".